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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 970390-CA

TRAVIS BEN HARDING,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a
second degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Where evidence of an outstanding arrest warrant was not

only relevant but necessary to explain the factual circumstances
surrounding the instant case, did the trial court properly admit
the evidence in conformity with rules 404 (b) and 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence?
2.

Does rule 404(b) apply to defendant's post-arrest

statements revealing his knowledge of other persons' involvement
in illegal activities, stolen guns, and drugs?

1

When an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling
concerning the admissibility of evidence under rule 404(b), it
"review[s] closely the trial court's justifications" but does not
conduct a de novo review.

State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 489-90

(Utah 1997) .
In reviewing a ruling on the admissibility of evidence
pursuant to rule 403, an appellate court accords broad discretion
to the determination of the trial court.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

932, 938 (Utah 1994) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (1997).
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403 (1997) .

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a
second degree felony, when drugs were found on his person after
he was arrested on an unrelated warrant (R. 1, 187). After a
jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 116).

The

court sentenced him to a suspended term of l-to-15 years in the
Utah State Prison; ordered him to serve 36 months on probation,
with 270 days in the Utah County Jail; and levied a fine of $1000
or 200 hours of community service, along with an $850 surcharge
and substance abuse therapy (R. 125-26).

Defendant filed this

appeal (R. 127).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict.
1992).

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah

Armed with an arrest warrant in the name of "Travis Ben

Martin,"1 Detective Clark Neilsen of the Pleasant Grove Police
Department went to Rick's Auto, a shop located just 190 feet from
the Daybreak Training School (R. 187-88, 195).

There, he

approached defendant, who was wearing a black leather coat and

Defendant's biological father bore the surname "Martin,"
which was the name that appeared on defendant's driver's license
and, consequently, on the arrest warrant. Nonetheless, defendant
was generally known as Travis Ben Harding, reflecting the surname
adopted by his mother when she married a man named Harding before
defendant was born (R. 246).
3

talking to a mechanic about his car (R. 251-52).

The detective

served the warrant, took defendant into custody, and mirandized
.-him (R. 188, 192).

In response to the detective's question about

whether defendant had any weapons or contraband on his person,
defendant removed two knives from his pockets and turned them
over to the detective.
building with defendant

After a pat-down, the detective left the
(Id.).

Prior to leaving for the police station, defendant told the
detective that he needed to tell his grandfather, who had driven
him to the auto shop, where they were going (R. 189).

The

detective testified:
I asked [the grandfather] if he could tell me
[defendant's] name. He indicated it was
Travis. And I asked him if it was Travis
Martin. He said it was. And at that time
Travis, who is standing next to me, says kind of yells out, "Harding." And his
grandfather looked at him and then he looked
at me. And he said, "Well, he uses both
names."
(IdL) At the police station, the detective uncuffed defendant and
asked him to remove his personal property from his pockets.
Defendant retrieved some cigarettes.
"But there was a bag.

The detective testified:

And it alerted me by the way he was

removing these items . . .

it was as if he were concealing

something or attempting to . . . " (R. 190).

The detective

continued, "And the nature of how he was laying the cigarettes

4

down caused me to question what he was doing.
cigarettes.

So I moved the

And I saw the bag, exposed the bag and I picked it

up" (LcL) .
The "bag" was the corner section of a plastic baggie, its
lining coated with a white powder, with a more detectable amount
at the bottom (R. 191, 205, 214). When the detective asked
defendant what it was, defendant responded that he didn't know
(R. 190).

Then, with defendant watching, the detective performed

a field test on the substance, which tested positively for
methamphetamine (R. 191-92) .
Defendant immediately became emotional (R. 192).

Over

objection by defense counsel, the detective testified that
defendant said he "knew a lot of different illegal activity,
stolen guns and drugs . . . that he could hook me up with so that
I could give him a break on the criminal charges because he
didn't want to go to jail" (R. 193).

Defendant was "seemingly

very desperate to work something out" (Id.) .
At trial, defendant testified that the coat in which the
drugs were found had been his, but that he had given it to his
wife, who had been upset over losing a similar coat (R. 248).
She had been wearing it regularly, while he had only picked it up
that day because it happened to be hanging over a kitchen chair
as he was on his way out the door to Rick's Auto (R. 249, 251).
He further stated that the cigarettes found in the coat pocket

5

were his wife's brand, not his, and that he always carried his
cigarettes in the back pocket of his pants rather than in his
coat pocket (R. 255, 271).
On cross-examination, defendant disputed significant aspec
of the detective's testimony, which was based on a report the
detective had written the day after the arrest (R. 212).
Defendant testified that the detective neither told him that he
possessed an arrest warrant nor asked him to turn over any
weapons he might have (R. 261-62, 266).

Defendant testified

that, contrary to the detective's observation, he was not tryin
to conceal anything when he emptied his pockets (R. 275).
Defendant testified that the detective did not perform a drug
field test in his presence (Id.).

The detective, defendant

asserted, suffered from a faulty memory.

In contrast, although

he made no notes of the events, defendant maintained that he
possessed "quite an exceptional memory'' (R. 277).
After considering the evidence presented and weighing the
credibility of the witnesses, the jury convicted defendant as
charged, of possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free
zone, a second degree felony (R. 325, 326).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that evidence of the arrest warrant that
prompted the detective to first confront him was inadmissible
pursuant to rule 404 (b) .

However, where the arrest warrant

6

served the non-character purpose of filling in facts necessary
for the jury to understand how the detective came to discover
defendant in possession of drugs, it was admissible.

And,

contrary to defendant's assertion, the warrant was also
admissible pursuant to rule 403.

Defendant failed to demonstrate

how the probativeness of the evidence was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial impact.

Furthermore, because the

warrant was substantively unrelated to the charge at issue here
and addressed only a minor violation, it was unlikely to carry
any prejudice at all, much less the degree of prejudice that
would substantially outweigh its value in completing the story
before the jury.
Defendant also argues that his post-arrest statements,
evidencing an attempt to "strike a deal" with the detective by
providing information about criminal activity, were admitted in
violation of the same two rules.

At the outset, this argument

fails because rule 404(b) refers to prior personal acts, and
defendant's statements refer to the criminal activity of others.
3ut, even if his statements are interpreted to mean that
defendant himself was of bad character, the evidence would still
come m

under rule 404 (b) as probative evidence of knowledge and

intent, the only disputed aspect of the charge before the jury.
Finally, because the direct probativeness of the evidence was not
sjostantially outweighed by any prejudice that might be

7

indirectly inferred from it, the evidence also passes muster
under rule 403.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
EVIDENCE OF THE ARREST WARRANT WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED BECAUSE IT WAS
RELEVANT FOR THE NON-CHARACTER
PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING WHY THE
OFFICER CONFRONTED DEFENDANT AT THE
AUTO REPAIR SHOP AND BECAUSE NO
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE FLOWED FROM
ITS ADMISSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion in limine to exclude evidence of the arrest warrant that
prompted the detective to confront him at Rick's Auto (Br. of
App. at 9 ) . He asserts that the warrant evidence was
inadmissible under rule 404(b) because it "was not proof of
'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge [or]
identity.'" (Br. of App. at 11 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 404(b))).
Defendant further asserts that the evidence was prejudicial
because it undermined his credibility in the eyes of the jury
(I^J •
At the outset, rule 404(b), governing evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person, is an
"inclusionary" rule.

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah

App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993); State v. Taylor,
818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991).

That is, "[r]ule 404(b) does

not exclude evidence unless it fits an exception; rather, it
8

allows admission of relevant evidence *other than to show merely
the general disposition of the defendant.'" State v. Jamison, 767
P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989)(quoting State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d
539, 546 (Utah 1983)).
Here, reference to the outstanding arrest warrant served a
clear "non-character purpose" because it completed the story of
the case for the jury.

See Utah R. Evid. 404 (b) (1998) .2

The

story began when a police detective, pursuing an outstanding
arrest warrant, and defendant, checking on the status of his car,
converged at Rick's Auto (R. 187, 251). After the detective
served the warrant and made the arrest, he asked defendant to
empty his personal property from his pockets.

In the course of

doing so, defendant removed a baggie from his coat pocket, and
the detective determined that it contained contraband (R. 190).
Absent evidence of the outstanding warrant, the jury would
have no explanation for the detective's presence at Rick's Auto.
Indeed, absent the warrant, the detective would have had no

"

A recent addition to rule 404 (b) clarifies its meaning in
light of State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Now the
rule contains the following final sentence:
In other words, evidence offered under this
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a
non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
Utah R. Evid. 403 (b) (1998) . Because this sentence clarifies,
rather than changes, the rule in effect at the time this case was
adjudicated, the phrase "non-character purpose" is used here as a
shorthand reference to the essential import of the rule.
9

reason to approach defendant, arrest him, handcuff him, or ask
him to empty his pockets.

In essence, the evidence of the

outstanding warrant "completed the story" by providing a factual
basis for the detective's subsequent interaction with defendant.
Courts may allow evidence of an arrest warrant in a
subsequent prosecution when facts surrounding the arrest are
necessary for the jury to understand the situation.

See, e.g.,

United States v. Garces, 133 F.3d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir.
1998)(admitting evidence of homicide arrest warrant as
"explanatory background" for weapons charges arising from
arrest); United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509, 513 (11- Cir.
1996)(federal rule 404(b) does not exclude an uncharged offense
which (1) "arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions as the charged offense, (2) [is] necessary to
complete the story of the crime, or (3) [is] inextricably
intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense") ;
United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10"-" Cir.
1995)(evidence is admissible when it provides context for the
crime, is necessary to a full presentation of the case, or is
appropriate in order to complete the story of the crime by
proving its immediate context or res gestae (quoting United
States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4" Cir. 1980)); State v.
Lockheart, 410 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Iowa App. 1997)(when acts are so
connected in time and place that they form a continuous

10

transaction, rule 404(b) does not prevent the whole transaction
from being shown "to complete the story of what happened"); State
v. Fleinold, 838 P.2d 462, 467 (Mo. App. 1992)("Evidence of a
separate crime that is a part of a sequence of events connected
to the crime for which the defendant is being tried is admissible
because it is part of the res gestae of the crime charged" and
"to present a complete and coherent picture of events
surrounding" the main charge).
While the search warrant here represented evidence of "other
crimes, wrongs or acts" committed by defendant, it was introduced
only to fill in facts necessary for the jury to understand how
the detective came to discover defendant in possession of
contraband.

Two Utah courts have touched upon other such

evidence used to complete a story.

State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d

1207 (Utah App. 1991), tacitly applied the majority rule
articulated above.

It held that although rule 404 contains no

express exception for "background information" showing how the
charges came forward, "the prosecutor is entitled to paint a
factual picture of the context in which the events in question
transpired."

.Id. at 1210 n.4.

Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court

earlier held that evidence showing "the general circumstances
surrounding" the crime should not be excluded as "prior crimes"
evidence.

State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah

1986)(evidence that defendant purchased stolen property with

11

marijuana was admissible over rule 404(b) objection).

Because

evidence of the arrest warrant here was used for the noncharacter purpose of completing the story, it was likewise
properly admitted under rule 404 (b) .
The evidence of the arrest warrant was also admissible
pursuant to rule 403, just as the trial court determined after
weighing its probativeness against its potential prejudice.
Defendant argues only that "[t]he fact that he was wanted for
other criminal acts prejudiced his credibility with the jury"
(Br. of App. at 11).

Even assuming arguendo that this bald

averment is correct, however, it would be insufficient to
establish a violation of rule 403 because evidence is not
inadmissible merely because it is prejudicial.

That is, "[i]f

evidence is prejudicial but is at least equally probative[,] . .
. it is properly admissible.

Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571.

Indeed,

all relevant evidence is presumed admissible pursuant to rule 403
unless it has "an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice,
inflame, or mislead" the jury.
1221-22 (Utah 1993) .

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,

Because defendant has failed to articulate

now the probativeness of the search warrant evidence was
substantially outweighed by some prejudicial effect, his argument
fails.
Furthermore,

vx

if the evidence has relevancy to explain the

circumstances surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible for

12

that purpose; and the fact that it may tend to connect the
defendant with another crime[, wrong, or act] will not render it
incompetent."

State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah

1978) (citations omitted); accord State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1991).
Plainly, the evidence of the arrest warrant was relevant to
explain the circumstances under which this case arose.

Indeed,

no other explanation for the detective's conduct existed.

And,

according to defendant's own testimony, the warrant arose from a
fraudulent car inspection, not only an entirely different matter
than the drug possession charge at issue here, but also a
significantly less serious violation as well.

The existence of

an outstanding warrant arising from a vehicle inspection matter
would be unlikely to rouse any reasonable jury to the degree of
"overmastering hostility" that would mandate its exclusion.
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988).
Because any possible prejudice flowing from the jury's
knowledge that defendant was the subject of an outstanding arrest
warrant was substantially outweighed by the probative value of
the evidence to complete the story, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting it.

13

POINT TWO
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S POST ARREST
STATEMENTS ADDRESS THE CONDUCT OF
OTHER PERSONS, THEY DO NOT FALL
WITHIN THE AMBIT OF RULE 404(b); TO
THE EXTENT THAT THE STATEMENTS MAY
BE INTERPRETED AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER, THEY ARE
NONETHELESS ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE
404(b) BECAUSE THEY ALSO
DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE
AND INTENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his
post-arrest statements to the detective as "probative as to his
intent to commit the crime charged," pursuant to rule 404(b). (R.
54 or addendum A ) .

Without articulating any specifics, he also

argues that any probative value of the statements was "clearly
outweighed" by their prejudicial impact (Br. of App. at 14).
The statements to which defendant objects were uttered after
the detective, in defendant's presence, conducted a field test on
the white substance in the baggie (R. 191-92).

According to the

detective's testimony, when the test came up positive for
methamphetamine, defendant "became very emotional" (R. 192):
He said that he knew a lot of different
illegal activity, stolen guns and drugs, that
he was very aware of or had knowledge of that
he could hook me up with so that I could give
him a break on the criminal charges, because
he didn't want to go to jail. And he was
seemingly very desperate to work something
out.
(R. 193).

Defendant asserts that his statements run afoul of
14

rule 404(b), which provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith."

In

essence, defendant seems to be arguing that his statements should
not have been admitted because their sole purpose was to
demonstrate that he was a bad person with a criminal disposition
who, by possessing drugs, acted in conformity with that
disposition.
Defendant's argument fails on several fronts.

At the

outset, rule 404(b) refers to "other crimes, wrongs, or acts"
committed

by defendant.

See Daniels, 584 P.2d at 882 (under

predecessor rule, "evidence of other crimes allegedly
by

the

defendant

committed

is not admissible if the purpose is to disgrace

the defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to
commit crime and thus likely to have committed the crime
charged")(emphasis added).

In contrast, defendant's statements

to the detective plainly referenced criminal activity
by others.

committed

In essence, defendant was offering his services as a

confidential informant: in exchange for a "deal" on the drug
charge inevitably emerging from the discovery of methamphetamine
in his pocket, defendant would divulge information about crimes
committed by others that would impliedly surpass what the
detective had on him.

Thus, defendant's statements, referring

not to his own past criminal activity, but to the criminal

15

activity of others, did not fall within the ambit of rule 404 (b) .
Defendant argues that his statements do implicate rule
404(b) because they imply personal familiarity with individuals
involved in criminal conduct (Br. of App. at 11). Thus, if a
defendant associated with persons of bad character, a jury might
infer that he, too, was a person of bad character and, in this
instance, was merely acting in conformity with that character.3
Even given this reading, however, defendant's claim must
fail because an additional, non-character purpose existed for the
admission of his statements.

The law is well-settled that

"[a]dmission of prior bad acts is proper when it tends to prove a
contested material element of the crime charged."
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990).

State v.

In this case, where

it is undisputed that defendant was found in possession of
methamphetamine, the only contested element of the charge was his
knowledge and intent.

Indeed, the defense rested entirely on

defendant's assertion that he had no idea there was
methamphetamine in his coat pocket (R. 257, 311, 316).

Because

defendant's eagerness to make a deal with the detective undercut
his claim of ignorance by showing consciousness of guilt, its

This argument seems to resonate more with rule 404(a)
than with rule 404 (b) . However, because defendant did not make
such a claim either in the trial court or in this Court, the
claim is waived. State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 214 (Utah
1933); State v. Steaqell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).
16

admission was proper as evidence of his knowledge and intent.4
State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Utah App. 1996).
Defendant's statements, as the trial court determined after
engaging in the proper weighing process, were also admissible
pursuant to rule 403.

The threshold inquiry is "whether the

proferred evidence has an unusual propensity to unfairly
prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury."
1221.

Dunn, 850 P.2d at

Since defendant does not assert that his statements had

unusual prejudicial effect, he "must overcome rule 403's
presumption in favor of admitting the proferred evidence."

Id.

at 1222.
Here, the issue of defendant's intent to possess the drugs
was central to the disposition of the case.

His statements,

carrying a strong inference of consciousness of guilt, were
directly probative of his knowledge and intent.

In contrast, his

statements only weakly inferred that he committed this particular
crime because he was a person of bad character who was acting in
conformity with that character.

That is, several inferential

steps are required to get from defendant's statement that he was
aware of criminal activity to the ultimate conclusion that

4

Defendant argues that defendant had no knowledge of the
drugs and that his statements reflect a panicked response to the
discovery of the contraband in his pocket rather than an insight
into his knowledge and intent (Br. of App. at 11). Because the
evidence is susceptible to multiple interpretations, however, its
significance was properly left to the jury. See State v. Myers,
606 P.2d 250, 252-53 (Utah 1980).
17

defendant committed this particular crime with knowledge and
intent.

Because the direct probativeness of the statements are

not substantially outweighed by the attenuated prejudice that
could flow from them, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting them.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
second degree felony conviction for possession of a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
Because the proper interpretation of rule 404 (b) could be
further clarified based on this case, the State requests both
oral argument and a published opinion.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \^_ day of September, 1998.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

L
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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41-77
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 961401599
DATE: April 9, 1997

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
TRAVIS BEN HARDING,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion in Limine. Having
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of the Motion, the
Court hereby grants in part and denies in part the Motion and delivers the following
Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
The defendant, Travis Ben Harding, is charged with Possession of
Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony and is set for trial before
this Court on April 10, 1997. The Defendant has an extensive criminal history, including
prior convictions for Possession of a Controlled Substance, Attempted Aggravated Assault,
Assault on a Peace Officer, and Criminal Trespass. The Defendant has served time on these
convictions in the Utah County Jail, as well as a federal prison in Arizona.
When the Defendant was taken into custody on October 24, 1996, he made
statements to the arresting officer about his inyolvement and contacts with drug suppliers and
a theft ring. The Defendant now requests this Court prohibit the use of these prior
convictions and statements in the jury trial set for April 10.

0055

Opinion of the Court
The Court agrees with the Defendants assertion of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and will not allow any evidence of prior criminal behavior or convictions as
character evidence to prove conformity therewith in the State's case in chief. The Court will
also not allow any references to prior crimes for general impeachment purposes. However,
the Court will allow the State to address the Defendant's prior criminal history to impeach
specific statements of the Defendant should he choose to testify in his own behalf. In
particular, should the Defendant testify that he has no knowledge of or involvement in drugs,
the Court will allow evidence of his prior conviction to be introduced and the Defendant may
be questioned about prior drug convictions on cross-examination.
The Court denies the Defendant's motion as to the statements made to the arresting
officer on October 24, 1996. An essential element of the offense of possession of
methamphetamines is intent.

The Court finds that the Defendant's statements are probative

as to his intent to commit the crime charged. In addition, the Court finds that the probative
value of the statements outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence regarding
outstanding warrants that resulted in the Defendant being in custody will be admitted relative
to the statements made to the arresting officer.
Order
The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motion in Limine with respect to evidence
of prior crimes offered for general impeachment purposes. The Court denies the Defendant's
Motion with respect to evidence of prior crimes offered for specific impeachment purposes,
and with respect to statements by the Defendant to the arresting officer.
DATED this 9th day of April, 1997.

